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CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES, PROVISIONS, AND RULES 
None 1 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff/Appellant appeals a summary judgment dismissal. This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented to the Court for review, together with the 
respective standards of review: 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Issue. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment when there was a contested material issue of fact regarding whether 
or not plaintiffs reliance upon defendants' fraudulent representations was unreasonable? 
Preserved for Appeal at 136-149. 
Standard of Review. The Court of Appeals should review this case de novo. 
Winegarv.Froerer. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Other than case law, there is no dispositive statutory authority. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On September 7, 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendants had sold 
him a truck which they fraudulently and negligently represented, prior to plaintiff signing 
the contract, to have a new engine (TR 1-4). After a year and several months of litigation 
a pretrial conference was held on January 10, 2001 (TR 98). Trial had been set for April 
16, 2001. At the pretrial conference, despite the passing of the dispositive motions cut-
off date of October 9, 2000 (TR 94-95), defendants requested that they be permitted to 
file a Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court set aside the dispositive motion cut-
off date and allowed defendants to file their Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants 
filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on January 12, 2001 and requested a hearing on 
the motion. The motion was fully briefed by both parties on January 29, 2001. Without 
granting oral argument, the trial court issued its ruling on February 22, 2001. The first 
final judgment was signed on April 2, 2001. However, the court did not rule on the issue 
of attorney's fees and refused to do so. Plaintiff then appealed the matter. The Court of 
Appeals dismissed the appeal as premature. The second final judgment was signed on 
January 6, 2003 which eliminated the issue on attorney's fees. The second notice of 
appeal was then filed on approximately January 23, 2003. Plaintiff then filed this current 
appeal. 
Defendants raised three issues in their Motion for Summary Judgment. The first is 
whether or not the merger doctrine and the parol evidence rule defeated plaintiffs cause 
of action for negligent misrepresentation. Pursuant to Robinson v. Tripco Inc., 2000 Ut 
App 200, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 2000), a case that was not cited by defendants 
in their motion, these doctrines apply to claims for negligent misrepresentation. In view 
thereof, plaintiff conceded that his claim for negligent misrepresentation was not well 
taken and does not appeal the dismissal of this cause of action. 
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Defendants' other arguments were that plaintiff could not show, as a matter of law, 
any evidence of: (1) reasonable reliance, or (2) intent to defraud. As to these issues the 
trial court entered its order granting summary judgment against the plaintiff. The trial 
court's decision was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court 
transferred the current proceeding to the Utah Court of Appeals for further action. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
1. Defendant Floyd Maestas ("Maestas") is a used car salesman for defendant 
Exclusive Cars, Inc. (TR 103). 
2. On December 4, 1998, the plaintiff purchased a 1991 Toyota truck ("truck") 
from defendants (TR 103). 
3. In conjunction with the sale, plaintiff executed several documents (TR 
104). 
4. The documents indicate that the sale was "AS IS" and NO warranty was 
provided (TR 104) 
5. Shortly before the purchase of the truck, plaintiff alleged that Maestas 
represented that the truck had a new engine. Plaintiff alleged that Maestas further told 
plaintiff that Dahle Toyota in Logan, Utah, installed the new engine (TR 104). 
6. Plaintiff alleged that the truck did not have a new engine (TR 104). 
7. Plaintiff alleged that the truck experienced mechanical failure (TR 104). 
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8. Plaintiff filed this action asserting two causes of action claims for 
fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation (TR 104). 
9. When they filed their Motion For Summary Judgment, defendants provided 
no factual or legal basis supporting an award of attorney's fees or any argument to the 
trial court asserting its alleged right to attorney's fees. The trial court did not award any 
attorney's fees in its memorandum decision and order granting defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment (TR 103-114, 150-168, 172-173). 
10. Defendants prepared a proposed judgment including an award of attorney's 
fees. Plaintiff objected to defendants' proposed judgment granting defendants' attorney's 
fees (TR 176-179, 186-189). 
11. When he purchased the truck, plaintiff was a 19-year-old high school graduate 
with no experience with automobile mechanics (TR 36, 44, 138-Larsen Depo. p 5 Ins 4-
21, p 65 Ins 3-5). 
12. In November 1998, plaintiff went to the defendants' car lot and spoke with 
defendants' salesperson Nikki on approximately two occasions to discuss the truck and 
test drive it. Plaintiff test drove it once. Nikki never indicated that it had a new engine. 
On the test drive, plaintiff neither heard nor saw anything that would have indicated that 
the engine had any problems (TR 39-40, 138-Larsen Depo. pp 39-43). 
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13. On December 4, 1998, defendant Floyd Maestas, a used car salesperson with 
six and one half years of experience, represented before the contract was signed that the 
truck had a new engine (TR 35, 37, 138--Larsen Depo. p 4; p 31 In 3-14). 
14. On December 4, 1998, defendant Floyd Maestas represented that the truck's 
new engine had been installed by Dahle Toyota of Logan. In fact, Maestas wrote the 
information as part of the contract paperwork on a post-it note and gave it to the plaintiff 
(TR 38, 42, 58, 138-Larsen Depo. pp 34-35, 57-58). 
15. The main reason that plaintiff agreed to purchase the truck at the price stated 
was because it was represented to have a new engine (TR 45, 138—Larsen Depo. p 77 In 
16-25; p 78 In 1-11). 
16. After plaintiff took possession of the truck, it broke down on December 17, 
1998. There was no indication on the test drive nor when plaintiff took possession that 
the engine was not new as represented by Mr. Maestas (TR 39-40, 139 Larsen Depo. pp 
39, 43, 45). 
17. It was determined that the truck's engine was not new and that it would cost 
between $2,500 and $8,600 to fix (TR 43,139-Larsen Depo. pp 62-63). 
18. In a conversation Mr. Maestas had with plaintiff in approximately April of 
1999, Mr. Maestas admitted that he had told plaintiff before he purchased the truck that 
the truck had a new engine (TR 139, 147-149-Maestas Depo. p 46, Ins 16-18; p 47 In 11-
18; p 50 In 6-13). 
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19. Mr. Maestas admitted that he would not tell a customer that a truck had a new 
engine unless he had the documents to back it up (TR 139, 146~Maestas Depo. p 12 Ins 
22-25). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred when it found, as a matter of law, that Mr. Larsen was 
unreasonable to rely upon the fraudulent representations of the defendants. This is a 
question of fact that cannot be ruled upon by weighing the evidence as the trial court did 
in summary judgment. A jury should be allowed to hear the evidence and make its 
determination based thereon. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE & THE MERGER DOCTRINE DO NOT 
APPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S ASSERTIONS OF FRAUD AND THEREFORE 
THE EXPRESS TERMS OF THE CONTRACT ARE IRRELEVANT 
THERETO 
Summary judgment is only appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R. Civ. 56(c); see also Heglar Ranch. Inc. v. Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980); 
Bill Brown Realty. Inc. v. Abbott. 562 P.2d 238, 239 (Utah 1977). In this case, it will be 
shown that the trial court was incorrect to hold that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact and that it misapplied Gold Standard. Inc. v. Getty Oil Co.. 915 P.2d 1060, 
1063 (Utah 1996). 
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In Robinson v. Tripco Inv.. 2000 Ut App 200, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 
2000), W.W. & W.B. Gardner. Inc. v. Mann. 680 P.2d 23 (Utah 1984), and Berkeley 
Bank v. Meibos. 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980), and as cited by defendant in Lamb v. 
Bangart 525 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah 1974), the Utah Courts have conclusively stated that: 
All preliminary negotiations, conversations, and verbal agreements are merged in 
and superseded by the subsequent written contract, and unless fraud, , . ,be 
averred, the writing constitutes the agreement between the parties and its terms 
cannot be altered by parol evidence. 
In this case fraud has been averred, therefore the merger doctrine and parol 
evidence rule do not apply. To prove fraud, plaintiff must demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that: (1) defendant Maestas made a representation about the truck he 
sold to plaintiff, (2) the representation concerned a presently existing material fact, (3) the 
representation was false, (4) the defendants knew the representation was false, or were 
recklessly indifferent as to the truth or falsity of the representation, (5) the defendants' 
intent was to induce plaintiff to buy the truck, (6) the plaintiff reasonably relied upon the 
representation in ignorance of its falsity, (7) the plaintiff relied upon the representation, 
(8) the plaintiff was induced to act by the defendants' misrepresentation, and (9) the 
plaintiff has been damaged. Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs.. 739 P.2d 634, 638 (Ct. 
App. Utah 1987). 
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants asserted that, as to these nine 
elements, plaintiff could not produce evidence of "reasonable reliance" or "intent to 
defraud." The trial court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment solely on the finding 
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that the plaintiff had not "reasonably relied upon" the defendants' fraudulent 
representation. 
A, THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF REASONABLE RELIANCE ON 
DEFENDANTS' MISREPRESENTATIONS. 
In Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs.. 739 P.2d 634, 639 (Ct. App. Utah 1987), 
the Court, in setting aside a trial court's dismissal of a fraud action, explained the concept 
of reasonable reliance: 
Reasonable reliance must be considered with reference to the facts of each case, 
and is usually a question for the jury to determine. Although it is impossible to 
draw precise legal boundaries of when reliance is reasonable, the courts have given 
some directions. Generally, a Plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive 
assertions of fact without independent investigation. It is only where, under 
the circumstance, the facts should make it apparent to one of his knowledge 
and intelligence, or he has discovered something which should serve a 
warning that he is being deceived, that a Plaintiff is required to make his own 
investigations Reliance also has been found reasonable even where a 
Plaintiff executes a written agreement in reliance upon verbal promises that 
the contrary written provision is not operative, or where a Plaintiff is induced 
to refrain from reading the contract." (Emphasis added). 
In this case, plaintiff has asserted that defendants, through defendant Maestas, a 
used cars salesperson with six and one half years of experience, made a positive assertion 
about the truck that Mr. Maestas wanted the plaintiff to purchase, stating that it had a new 
engine. Summary of Facts [SOF] above, fflf 5, 13-14. Not only did defendant Maestas 
represent that the truck had a new engine but that the truck's new engine had been 
installed by Dahle Toyota of Logan. SOF f 14. When viewed in the light most favorable 
to plaintiff, this comment added credence to defendant Maestas9 statement and caused 
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plaintiff to believe Mr. Maestas. Plaintiff did not observe or discover anything when 
inspecting the truck or test driving it that would have alerted him that the truck's engine 
was not new and that he should conduct an independent investigation. SOF Yf 5, 12, 13, 
16. At the time, plaintiff was a nineteen-year-old highschool graduate with no experience 
with automobile mechanics. SOF ^ 11. At no time during the negotiations or in the 
written contractual paperwork did defendant Maestas ever indicate that his representation 
was false nor did he retract his representation. 
Because of his youth, education, and non-mechanical background, a jury could 
find that plaintiffs reliance was reasonable. In fact, it could even be concluded that once 
he had learned that the truck had a new engine, his actions in purchasing the truck "as is" 
and declining to purchase a service contract support his reasonably relying on defendants' 
misrepresentations. A purchaser of a truck is likely to believe that a truck with a new 
engine or one with low milage is a more safe buy as an "as is" purchase. Plaintiff 
believed Mr. Maestas was telling the truth and there was nothing to tip him off that he 
should have distrusted Mr. Maestas. 
In applying "Gold Standard" the trial court stated: 
Assuming, as the Court has, that Defendant Maestas, in fact, represented 
that the vehicle Plaintiff was purchasing had a new motor, the question is whether 
it was reasonable for Plaintiff to rely on that representation without taking 
independent steps to verify it in light of contrary written documents. Plaintiff 
claims his reliance on Mr. Maestas statement was reasonable notwithstanding 4 
separate documents which he received and signed: (a) a "Motor Vehicle Contract 
of Sale," which clearly stated that there were no express or implied warranties on 
any used vehicles; (b) a waiver of benefits statement declining the offer to 
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purchase an extended warranty plan, and acknowledging that he bore "sole 
responsibility" for any repairs- (c) a document entitled "Buyer's Guide" (also 
referenced in the vehicle Contract of Sale) which was displayed in the vehicle 
window and which stated "AS IS-NO WARRANTY" and which also indicated 
that no systems were covered by any warranty; and (d) a "DUE BILL" which in 
capital letters indicated "ORAL PROMISES ARE NOT BINDING ON THE 
DEALER!" along with a handwritten statement below that stating "Nothing else 
promised, implied, or expressed " Moreover, although Plaintiff had been advised 
by his brother-in-law (prior to concluding the deal) to secure written 
documentation of Maestas' representation, Plaintiff made a single request which 
was not directly responded to. To the extent that Plaintiffs request yielded some 
information (i.e., the name of the dealer that had worked on the vehicle's engine), 
Plaintiff then failed to follow-up on the information he was provided orally. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Gold Standard, supra, conclusively 
resolves the question of "reasonable reliance" at issue here. "Under the law of 
[Utah], a party cannot reasonably rely upon oral statements by the opposing party 
in light of contrary written information. No matter how naive or inexperienced 
[Plaintiff was], [he] could not close [his] eyes and accept unquestioningly any 
representations made to [him]. It was [his] duty to make such investigation and 
inquiry as reasonable care under the circumstances would dictate." Gold Standard, 
915 P.2d at 1068 (citing Rubev v. Wood, 373 P.2d 386, 387-88 (Utah 1962)). 
"The one who complains of being injured by.. .false representation cannot 
heedlessly accept as true whatever is told him, but has the duty of exercising such 
degree of care to protect his own interests as would be exercised by an ordinary, 
reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances, and if he fails to do so, is 
precluded from holding someone else to account for the consequences of his own 
neglect." Gold Standard , at 1069 (quoting Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 
P.2d 124 (Utah 1982)). Plaintiff here was provided not one, but many, "red flags" 
which he chose to disregard. Having done so, he must deal with the 
"consequences of his own neglect." 
The facts of Gold Standard are very different from those in this case and were 
misapplied by the trial court. In Gold Standard, the parties, "GSI and Getty," were two 
sophisticated business entities, that, "consistently dealt with each other at arm's length." 
In Gold, GSI, was told explicitly in subsequent writings that the oral representations made 
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in earlier discussions by Getty were no longer valid. As stated above, in this case 
defendant Maestas never retracted his representations that the truck had a new engine. 
Plaintiff, an unsophisticated teen, with no mechanical experience believed him. 
Moreover, unlike Gold Standard, the paperwork plaintiff signed did not ever indicate that 
the truck did not have a new engine, it merely indicated that the purchase was "AS IS" 
with no warranties. 
If Gold Standard were applicable to plaintiffs case, the defendants would have 
had to have put in the paperwork that the affirmative assertion that Mr. Maestas's earlier 
representation that the car had a new engine was false and should not have been relied on 
by the plaintiff. Since there was no information that plaintiff had been given indicating 
that Mr. Maestas was defrauding him, there was no duty to make further inquiries or to 
follow through and obtain the paperwork as suggested by plaintiffs brother-in-law. 
Admittedly, probably the fact most favorable to defendants' position is that one of 
the documents that plaintiff signed stated, "ORAL PROMISES ARE NOT BINDING ON 
THE DEALER!" Nonetheless, if this statement would mean as a matter of law that 
plaintiffs reliance was not reasonable, it would only apply to the dealer and not Mr. 
Maestas. Plaintiff would submit that because of the "averred fraud" that this written 
statement would still not indicate that there is no disputed material fact. 
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The facts of this case are more similar to Cardiomed, Inc. In Cardiomed, Inc. vs. 
Tripco Investment, Inc.. 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 2000), a case decided after 
Gold Standard. In Cardiomed. the court stated that: 
[T]o determine whether the reliance was reasonable, the reliance 'must be 
considered with reference to the facts of each case.' Conder, 739 P.2d at 638. In 
general, a Plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive assertions of fact without 
independent investigation. It is only where, under the circumstances, the facts 
should make it apparent to one of his knowledge and intelligence, or he has 
discovered something which should serve as a warning that he is being 
deceived, that a Plaintiff is required to make his own investigation. I d . . . . 
Applying the foregoing legal principles to the facts of this case, we cannot say as a 
matter of law that Cardiomed was unreasonable in its reliance on Tripp's 
statements regarding the structural integrity of the building. Viewing the facts in 
the light most favorable to Cardiomed, they demonstrate that Robinson walked 
through the building with Tripp before Cardiomed purchased it. Robinson 
questioned Tripp regarding some problems he observed and Tripp responded that 
he had been involved in the construction and engineering of the building, and that 
the building had no structural defects. To support that claim, Tripp then provided 
Robinson with an inspection report that failed to note any structural problems with 
the building. Simply stated, because Tripp held himself out as someone with 
superior knowledge of the building and then lent support to his 
representations by providing an inspection report, a genuine issue of material 
fact exists as to whether Cardiomedfs reliance was reasonable. Accordingly, 
because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the three elements of 
fraud relied upon, summary judgment on that cause of action was improperly 
granted. 
Similarly, Mr. Maestas, held himself out as someone with superior knowledge of 
the truck's condition and categorically stated that the truck had a new engine, thus 
justifying the requested purchase price. Mr. Meaestas went so far as to represent Dahle's 
as the place where the new engine had been installed. When viewing the facts in the light 
most favorable to the Plaintiff, based upon the "[Plaintiffs'] knowledge and 
-12-
intelligence/5 and the fact that, as Plaintiff testified that he never "discovered something 
which should serve as a warning that he [was) being deceived/' it was reasonable for 
him to rely on Mr. Maestas' misrepresentation. 
The facts of this case are also more similar to Semenov v. Hill 982 P.2d 578, 
(Utah 1999) another case decided after Gold Standard. In Semenov. the court stated that: 
Hill contends that, as a matter of law, Semenov's allegations cannot support a 
claim of misrepresentation. He asserts that the documentation available at the 
closing showed the business to be losing money and that Semenov could not 
have relied reasonably upon any oral representations to the contrary. Hill 
relies on our decision in Gold Standard as disposing of Semenov's claim that 
language difficulties can create a triable issue of fact that would be material to a 
fraud claim. Hill relies on the statement in Gold Standard that "under the law of 
this state, a party cannot reasonably rely upon oral statements by the opposing 
party in light of contrary written information" to support his claim that a dispute 
over Semenov's English proficiency is not a dispute over a "material" fact. 915 
P.2datl068. 
Gold Standard is inapposite. That case did not involve a party asserting a 
language deficiency; rather, it involved two sophisticated parties proficient in 
English. Here, the question of Semenov1 s language capability is material to his 
fraud claim. It is true that the general rule pertaining to acceptance of an offer by 
signing is that "where a person signs a document, he is not permitted to show that 
he did not know its terms, and in the absence of fraud or mistake he will be 
bound by all its provisions, even though he has not read the agreement and does 
not know its contents." 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 41(f) (1963) (emphasis added); see 
also id. § 139; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 157 cmt. b (1981). However, 
it is also true that "the illiteracy of a party has an important bearing on the 
question of the existence of fraud in procuring [a] signature/' 17 C.J.S. 
Contracts § 139 (1963). Semenov's English proficiency or the lack thereof is a 
material fact that "should be considered in determining whether or not he has 
been defrauded." Id. 
Because Semenov and Hill disagree on the state of Semenov's English 
proficiency at the time of the closing, a factual dispute exists which must be 
resolved by a jury or a judge after an evidentiary hearing. Our decision to remand 
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this case is consistent with Heuter v. Coastal Airlines Inc., where a New Jersey 
court overturned a summary judgment in favor of the defendant and held that a 
jury should decide whether an uneducated and illiterate non-English-speaking 
Plaintiff should be bound to a release form he signed with an airline when the 
contents of the writing were unknown to him. 12 N.J. Super. 490, 79 A.2d 880, 
883 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951). 
Again, similarly, defendants' claim that, "the documentation available at the 
closing [of the sale of the car] showed the [car was sold as is with no warranties] and 
that [Plaintiff] could not have relied reasonably upon any oral representations to the 
contrary." Nevertheless, like Semenov's illiteracy, Plaintiff was an unsophisticated 
nineteen-year-old. Moreover, unlike this case, in Semenov, the court noted that the Gold 
Standard case "involved two sophisticated parties proficient in English. Here, the 
question of [Plaintiffs inexperience] is material to his fraud claim." 
B. THERE IS EVIDENCE OF AN INTENT TO DEFRAUD OR DECEIVE. 
To maintain a cause of action for fraud, plaintiff must prove that Maestas either 
knew his representation was false or made the representation recklessly knowing that 
there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base the representation. 
In Galloway v. AFCO Dev. Corp., 777 P.2d 506, 508 (Ct. App. Utah 1989) the 
court stated that: 
Intentional fraud generally requires a showing of intent to deceive, that is, the 
misrepresented intent to induce the victim's reliance on the false representation. 
The intent to deceive, required for common law fraud, may be inferred where 
a misrepresentation is voluntarily communicated to the victim with 
knowledge that it is false, or without knowing whether it is true or false but 
knowing that the victim is likely to rely on it. Thus . . . it is sometimes said that 
a "reckless" misrepresentation, made "knowing that the [the misrepresenter] had 
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insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a misrepresentation" is 
tantamount to the intent to deceive. 
Also, in Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), the court favorably cited an 
Idaho case for the holding that under the doctrine of constructive fraud the vendor of 
goods or land has a special duty to know the truth of his representations and is presumed 
to know the facts to which his representations relate. Consequently, a misrepresentation 
made by such a vendor is fraudulent even if not made knowingly, willfully or with actual 
intent to deceive. 
Here, plaintiff has alleged that he made several trips to the defendants' car lot. In 
his first trips he dealt with salesperson Nikki who never mentioned that the truck had a 
new engine. Then, after several negotiations in which plaintiff insisted that the price was 
too high, Mr. Maestas then indicated that the truck had a new engine. In his deposition, 
Mr. Maestas acknowledged that he would not make such a representation unless he had 
documents to back himself up. Hence, he himself establishes fact that if plaintiff s 
assertions are found to be true by the Jury, his actions were at the very least reckless. 
It is well understood in our mobile society that an engine is an integral part of an 
automobile. Mr. Maestas, a used car salesperson for many years, knew that this 
misrepresentation would clinch the deal and induce Mr. Larsen to agree to purchase the 
automobile at the higher purchase price. Hence, "the intent to deceive, required for 
common law fraud, may be inferred where a misrepresentation is voluntarily 
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communicated to the victim . . . without knowing whether it is true or false but 
knowing that the victim is likely to rely on it." 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff/appellant respectfully requests that this case be remanded to the trial 
court and that he be allowed to proceed with his cause of action for fraud. 
DATED this jl) day of March, 2003. 
ARROW LEGAL SOLUTIONS, LLC. 
'
v
 ./ 
V 
oren M. Lafnbert 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document on 
March \ ^ , 2003, postage prepaid to: 
Nick J. Colessides 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
NICK J. COLESSIDES (# 696) 
Attorneys at Law 
466 South 400 East, # 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
Tele: 801.521-4441 
Fax: 801.521-4452 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Exclusive Cars, Inc., and Floyd Maestas 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SANDY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY L. LARSEN : 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and FLOYD 
MAESTAS, 
Defendants. 
: AMENDED ^ JUDGMENT pXP^i__J^ 
: Case No.: 99 04 08099 
: Judge: Denise P. Lindberg 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment having come 
regularly for consideration and decision before the Honorable 
Denise P. Lindberg, and the Court having received the submissions 
of the parties: to-wit; the various memoranda and attached 
exhibits thereto, in support of each party's position, and the 
Court having considered the submissions of the parties, and the 
Court having made and entered its Decision and Order on 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, which decision, order, 
and findings, are incorporated herein and made a part hereof by 
this reference, and the Court having found: that plaintiff 
Wesley L. Larsen did not act reasonably in relying upon the oral 
representations of co-defendant Floyd Maestas, despite having 
been provided with many flags and ignoring the same, and 
plaintiff was neglectful in failing to follow up in an inquiry to 
determine the veracity of the information orally presented by co-
defendant Floyd Maestas, and having received from co-defendant 
Exclusive Cars, Inc., the automobile dealer, four separate and 
distinct documents disclaiming oral representations, and the 
Court having entered its order granting defendants' motion for 
summary judgment, and good cause otherwise appearing therefor, 
now upon motion of Nick J. Colessides, attorney for defendants 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED, AND ADJUDGED that plaintiff's 
complaint be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice, no 
cause of action. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY DEPARTMENT 
) 
WESLEY L.LARSEN, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., a ) 
Utah corporation, and FLOYD ) Civ. No. 990408099 
MAESTAS, ) 
Defendants. ) 
) _ 
Defendants have moved this Court for Summary Judgment and filed a Memorandum of Law in 
support of their motion. Plaintiff has responded and Defendants have replied to Plaintiffs 
opposition. Defendants have requested oral argument. However, after reviewing the parties' 
submissions and applicable case law, it is the Court's view that the dispositive issue governing the 
granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided. Accordingly, oral argument is 
not necessary. 
Plaintiffs complaint alleged both fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. In his opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, however, Plaintiff conceded that under the authority 
of Robinson v. Tripco Inv.. 2000 Ut. App. 200, his claim for negligent misrepresentation "must 
fail." Consequently the only issues for the Court are whether (1) there are material issues of fact 
that preclude summary judgment on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, or (2) if no material 
issues of fact are in dispute, whether Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56. 
Plaintiff has agreed with Defendants' statement of undisputed facts. In his opposition, however, 
Plaintiff raises additional factual statements, some of which (paragraphs 1-3) are accepted without 
dispute by Defendants, others of which (paragraphs 4-8) are disputed in whole or in part by 
Defendants. The Court hereby incorporates by reference all the undisputed facts noted in 
Defendants' and Plaintiffs memoranda. Furthermore, for purposes of ruling on this motion the 
Court accepts as true Plaintiffs version of the disputed facts. Notwithstanding this assumption, 
the Court concludes that, as a matter of law, Defendants must prevail. 
Plaintiffs remaining cause of action (for fraudulent misrepresentation) requires that Plaintiff 
establish the following elements: (1) that a representation was made, (2) concerning a presently 
existing material fact, (3) which was false, and (4) which the representor either knew to be false, 
or made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a 
representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it, and (6) that the 
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did, in fact, rely upon it, (8) and was 
thereby induced to act, (9) to that party's injury and damage. Gold Standard Inc.. v. Getty Oil 
915 P.2d 1060, 1067 (Utah 1996). This Court is mindful that "[w]hile the question of reasonable 
reliance is usually a matter within the province of the jury... there are instances where courts 
may conclude that, as a matter of law, there was no reasonable reliance." Id, The Court holds as 
a matter of law that, on the facts of this case, it was not reasonable for Plaintiff to act as he did. 
Assuming, as the Court has, that Defendant Maestas,in fact, represented that the vehicle Plaintiff 
was purchasing had a new motor, the question is whether it was reasonable for Plaintiff to rely on 
that representation without taking independent steps to verify it in light of contrary written 
documents. Plaintiff claims his reliance on Mr. Maestas statement was reasonable notwithstanding 
4 separate documents which he received and signed: (a) a "Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale," 
which clearly stated that there were no express or implied warranties on any used vehicles; (b) a 
waiver of benefits statement declining the offer to purchase an extended warranty plan, and 
acknowledging that he bore "sole responsibility" for any repairs; (c) a document entitled "Buyer's 
Guide" (also referenced in the vehicle Contract of Sale) which was displayed in the vehicle 
window and which stated "AS IS-NO WARRANTY" and which also indicated that no systems 
were covered by any warranty; and (d) a "DUE BILL" which in capital letters indicated "ORAL 
PROMISES ARE NOT BINDING ON THE DEALER!" along with a handwritten statement 
below that stating "Nothing else promised, implied, or expressed." Moreover, although Plaintiff 
had been advised by his brother-in-law (prior to concluding the deal) to secure written 
documentation of Maestas' representation, Plaintiff made a single request which was not directly 
responded to. To the extent that Plaintiff's request yielded some information (i.e., the name of 
the dealer that had worked on the vehicle's engine), Plaintiff then Med to follow-up on the 
information he was provided orally. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Gold Standard, supra, conclusively resolves the question 
of "reasonable reliance" at issue here. "Under the law of [Utah], a party cannot reasonably rely 
upon oral statements by the opposing party in light of contrary written information. No matter 
how naive or inexperienced [Plaintiff was], [he] could not close [his] eyes and accept 
unquestioningly any representations made to [him]. It was [his] duty to make such investigation 
and inquiry as reasonable care under the circumstances would dictate." Gold Standard. 915 P.2d 
at 1068 (citing Rubev v. Wood. 373 P.2d 386, 387-88 (Utah 1962)). "The one who complains of 
being injured b y . . . false representation cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever is told him, but 
has the duty of exercising such degree of care to protect his own interests as would be exercised 
by an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances, and if he fails to do so, is 
precluded from holding someone else to account for the consequences of his own neglect." Gold 
Standard, at 1069 (quoting Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty. 641 P.2d 124 (Utah 1982)). 
Plaintiff here was provided not one, but many, "red flags" which he chose to disregard. Having 
done so, he must deal with the "consequences of his own neglect." 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTE^^^^Sf i^is disposition, the trial 
dates are stricken. So ordered. 
Dated this 21* day of February, 2001. 
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